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INTRODUCTION 
It would be an Orwellian nightmare if one day we were to wake up 
and a single person decided which news stories were covered or how 
they were covered—in essence, if news stations colluded on their 
content.  Every day in Honolulu, Hawaii, two stations simulcast their 
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morning and evening news broadcasts.1  In San Angelo, Texas;2 
Denver, Colorado; and Charleston, South Carolina, different on-air 
personalities read the same script across competing stations.3  In 
Chicago, an editor coordinates the sharing of journalists, crews, and 
editorial staff of CBS, NBC, FOX, and CW to limit duplicative costs.4  
These are among the many examples of collusion in broadcast 
television news.5  The nightmare is here. 
Broadcast television firms have created various agreements of 
questionable antitrust legality to increase efficiency and profitability.6  
One example, known as a shared service agreement (SSA), 
coordinates the sharing of services and facilities between firms and 
inhibits quality-based competition between stations.7 
Although antitrust laws cover almost all anticompetive activities, 
the agencies charged with enforcing the laws rarely pursue 
agreements on quality.8  This lax enforcement probably stems from 
the difficulties of measuring quality and the procompetitive effects of 
standardization.9  For some industries, such as local broadcast 
television news (LBTN), the justifications for ignoring quality 
collusion appear nonexistent.10  Moreover, the quality reductions in 
broadcast television offend one of our society’s cherished tenets: the 
 
 1. See Danilo Yanich, Local TV News & Service Agreements: A Critical Look, 
UNIV. DEL., 8 (Oct. 2011), http://www.udel.edu/ocm/pdf/DYanichSSAFINALReport-
102411.pdf. 
 2. See Brian Stelter, You Can Change the Channel, but Local News Is the Same, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at A1. 
 3. Charleston, SC, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ changethechannels#!/ 
markets/97590/charleston-sc (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).  Agreements between 
stations exist in at least eighty-three television markets, covering 55% of American 
television households. Yanich, supra note 1, at 7.  The agreements can be very 
influential.  For example, in Denver, 71% of the stories, broadcast by two stations, 
are the same, and of those, 67% use the same video, 62% use the same script, 39% 
have the same reporter, and 11% have the same on-air personality. Id. at 26-27. 
 4. Chicago, IL, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ changethechannels#!/ 
markets/769/chicago-il (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 5. See generally Yanich, supra note 1. 
 6. See, e.g., Honolulu Stations in Shared Services Deal, TVNEWSCHECK (Aug. 
18, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2009/08/18/34810/honolulu-
stations-in-shared-services-deal. 
 7. See Christopher S. Reed, Regulating Relationships Between Competing 
Broadcasters, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 5-7 (2010). 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
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freedom of the press.11  Accordingly, the collusive agreements are 
worthy of closer scrutiny. 
This Note discusses quality-based collusion in three parts.  Part I 
provides a background of the legal treatment and economic theory 
regarding quality collusion and how economic principles apply to 
broadcast television.  Part II discusses the divergence between the 
antitrust laws as written and antitrust laws as enforced against quality 
collusion.  Part III provides strategies the antitrust community (the 
Community)12 could adopt to enforce the laws more effectively, with 
local broadcast television as a backdrop for applying the strategies. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW AND THE MEDIA 
Antitrust law has a long history extending back to 50 B.C. when the 
Lex Julia de Annona prevented the people from rigging Rome’s corn 
market.13  In the United States, the statutory history began with the 
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act).14  
While the debate over the purpose of antitrust law persists,15 courts 
and enforcement agencies lean heavily on economic theory in 
interpreting the statutes.16 
 
 11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1; Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 
(1967) (noting that freedom of the press is a “social necessity” required to maintain 
our political system (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967))). 
 12. The antitrust community includes the state and federal legislatures that write 
the antitrust statutes; the federal and state judiciary that decide antitrust cases; the 
federal agencies charged with enforcing the federal antitrust statutes (namely the 
Federal Trade Commission (Commission) and the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division (Division)); the state attorneys general that are charged with enforcing state 
antitrust statutes; the private legal professionals that bring and defend antitrust 
actions; and legal scholars of antitrust law. 
 13. See Michael Albery, Restrictive Trade Practices and the Conflict of Law, 44 
PROBS. PUB. & PRIVATE INT’L L. 125, 130 (1958). 
 14. See Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product 
Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE L.J. 305, 306–07 (1992). 
 15. Legal commentators, such as Robert Bork (ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 39–44 (1978)) and Richard Posner 
(RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9–32 (2d ed. 2001)), have asserted that the 
purpose of antitrust law is economic, while others claim that it is to benefit 
consumers. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
191, 196 (2008) (challenging such assertions). 
 16. For example, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993) and in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589–90 (1986), the Court accepted economic 
commentators’ consensus that predatory pricing is rarely successful.  In contrast with 
those cases, in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit 
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A. Antitrust Law and the Legal Treatment of Collusion 
While a complete discussion of U.S. antitrust law and policy 
exceeds the scope of this Note, this Section provides a general 
background on antitrust law, the parties involved, and how antitrust 
laws relate to quality collusion.  The bulk of antitrust law flows from 
two broadly written statutes: the Sherman Act17 and Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.18  The laws are enforced by 
the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) and the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division (Division) (collectively, the Agencies), 
although private parties can also bring antitrust claims.19  The 
Agencies and courts will flesh out the statutes with economic 
frameworks, key definitions, and procedural rules,20 though 
occasionally they make mistakes.21 
The Sherman Act established the initial framework for antitrust 
regulation in the United States.22  The key sections are: § 1 (“Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal . . . .”)23; 
and § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . .”).24  The statute does not specify a particular type of 
 
held that efficiencies would have to be “extraordinary” to defend an otherwise 
anticompetitive merger, and in that case the efficiencies were insufficient to counter 
the merger’s anticompetitive effects. See also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 
1088–89 (D.D.C. 1997).  Generally, the outcome of increasing economic efficiencies 
and protecting consumers are the same. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 15, at 
240. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. 
 19. Robert P. Taylor & Roxane C. Busey, Relationships Among Competitors, in 
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE 2012: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS, VOLUME ONE 131, 155, 
162 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956). 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) 
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restraint.25  The core restriction came shortly after the passage of the 
Sherman Act: the Supreme Court, in Hopkins v. United States, 
narrowed “[e]very restraint” to mean only unreasonable restraints.26  
To determine whether firms are unreasonably restricting trade, courts 
categorize the behavior.27  Multi-firm behavior, which is the focus of 
this Note, has several categories, including horizontal agreements,28 
vertical agreements,29 and mergers.  Each of those categories has sub-
categories.  For example, horizontal agreements include group 
boycotts, price fixing, market allocations, information exchanges, and 
joint ventures.30 
The cost of antitrust litigation31 makes prosecutorial discretion an 
important consideration for firms.  To help the Community 
understand, the Agencies jointly promulgate guidelines articulating 
the framework the Agencies use to determine whether to bring suit.32  
 
 25. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.  Firms can theoretically restrict price, quality, 
or quantity in their dealings with other firms or customers. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898) (“The act of congress must 
have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or 
contract among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, 
some bearing on interstate commerce . . . .”).  Even the most basic service contract 
that sets out a future performance, such as painting a home, restrains trade by 
eliminating future competition for the job.  A painter would be unwilling to take on 
the job without a contract to ensure payment.  As a result, the contract is a 
reasonable restraint of trade.  In comparison, an agreement between competitors that 
rigs an auction to obtain higher prices serves no legitimate purpose and is 
unreasonable. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87–88 (1911). 
 27. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2008). 
 28. A horizontal agreement is “[a]n agreement entered into between competing 
producers or dealers whereby they seek to control the market price of a commodity.” 
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 29. A vertical agreement is an agreement entered into between non-competing 
producers or dealers. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 722 
(1988). 
 30. See Taylor et al., supra note 19, at 11, 13. 
 31. See, e.g., Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P. v. F.E.R.C., 145 F.3d 398, 399 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (charging the Iroquois more than $15,000,000 in legal fees); In re 
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 522–25 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (plaintiff’s legal fees, based on lodestar, were more than $60,000,000 in addition 
to almost $19,000,000 in costs and fees); In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust 
Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees totaled 
$143,780,000). 
 32. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (Aug. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
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Written by antitrust professionals, the guidelines take into account 
economic theory as it develops and data gleaned from the Agencies’ 
experiences in enforcement.33  The Agencies update the guidelines 
regularly to remain current with economic theory and antitrust 
practice.34  Adding to the guidelines’ weight, courts also rely on the 
publications to understand and apply economic principles.35 
To limit the cost of antitrust litigation,36 courts match the depth of 
their query, based on these categories and subcategories, to the 
likelihood that a particular restraint on trade is unreasonable.37  The 
more likely it is that an activity is anticompetitive, the less time a 
court spends considering the reasonableness of the particular 
restraint.38  The scheme uses a rough tripartite categorization: rule of 
reason (ROR),39 per se,40 and quick look.41 
The “rule of reason” is the deepest, most common, and costly 
antitrust analysis.42  Under the ROR, the court considers a variety of 
factors, including information about the business, the condition of the 
business before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the 
restraint, and the effect of the restraint on other businesses to 
determine whether the conduct in question is reasonable or not.43  
While the ROR allows defendants to use many different factors, they 
may not claim that competition itself is unreasonable,44 although 
 
 33. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, 
Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 34. The Merger Guidelines have undergone five major revisions since 1982, while 
the bulk of U.S. Supreme Court case law and statutes predate 1982. See Carl Shapiro, 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 92 (2010). 
 35. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992, 
rev. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf 
[hereinafter 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (S.S.N.I.P. test to define 
relevant market in a tying case); see also United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying the 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES). 
 36. The oppressive costs of antitrust litigation were one of the driving forces 
behind the now seminal case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. See 550 U.S. 544, 
558–59 (2007). 
 37. See infra notes 32–62 and accompanying text. 
 38. Compare infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text, with infra notes 48–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 39. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 40. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 41. Taylor & Busey, supra note 19, at 205–11. 
 42. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 27, at 1214–15. 
 43. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 10. 
 44. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
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restraints designed to enhance social welfare can be reasonable.45  
Given the complexity of the case theory, parties on both sides enlist 
economists and industry experts to develop models and claim that 
“reasonableness” weighs in their favor.46  In the end, case ambiguities 
and complexities overwhelm the party with the burden of proof.47 
“Per se” is an unforgiving antitrust analysis reserved for activities 
that, in the judiciary’s experience, have lacked a legitimate business 
purpose.48  As the Court explained in Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No. 2 v. Hyde, the rationale for per se is to “avoid a 
burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where 
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct . . . render[s] unjustifiable 
the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves 
anticompetitive conduct.”49  When an activity is per se illegal, the 
plaintiff need not prove an anticompetitive intent or effect.50  The 
primary per se illegal activities are price fixing, division of markets, 
and group boycotts.51 
To wade deeper into the murky waters of antitrust litigation than 
per se allows, without the full ROR analysis, the Court recently 
established a “quick look” analysis.52  The quick look is an 
intermediate inquiry.  It applies when someone with a “rudimentary 
understanding of economics” could determine that the alleged 
activity would have anticompetitive effects.53  Under this type of 
analysis, defendants can demonstrate procompetitive economic 
justifications for their facially anticompetitive behavior to establish 
the restraint’s reasonableness.54  If the defendant fails, the conduct is 
 
 45. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (using experts 
to break down cost differentials in submarkets with and without competition). 
 46. See generally United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956); Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. at 1066. 
 47. Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Antitrust Procedure and Substance 
After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, 
Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1986). 
 48. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 49. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) (citing 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1982)). 
 50. See id. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
 52. The Supreme Court alluded to the idea of a “quick look” analysis in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984), although it 
went unnamed until California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999). 
 53. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770. 
 54. See generally id.; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110. 
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illegal.55  Although it has yet to happen, if the defendant meets the 
burden, the court will probably adjudicate under the ROR.56 
To tease apart “quick look” and per se, consider collegiate 
football57: a functioning football league requires participating colleges 
to agree on various aspects of game play, player recruitment, and 
player compensation to function as an amateur league.  Each of these 
is a horizontal agreement, but they are also legal.58  In the early 1980s, 
the NCAA fixed the price and quantity at which they sold television 
rights to stations among participating schools.59  Because collegiate 
sports require certain agreements, the Court utilized the quick look 
standard, rather than a stricter per se analysis.60  Because some 
agreement was necessary, the Court allowed the NCAA to rebut a 
presumption of illegality with evidence of the restraint’s 
reasonableness.61  Although the NCAA proposed various 
justifications for the restraint’s reasonableness, such as ensuring 
stadium attendance by limiting the supply of televised football and 
the non-profit status of the NCAA, the Court determined that the 
NCAA’s restraint was illegal.62 
Antitrust violations have several affirmative defenses, two of which 
are especially relevant to multi-firm conduct: efficiency63 and a failing 
company.64  The efficiency defense asserts that the efficiencies that an 
otherwise illegal restraint creates are so great that the restraint is 
reasonable65 while the failing company defense claims that the 
continued existence of one or both of the firms is economically 
 
 55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 27, at 1215. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Lewis Cole, The NCAA: Mass Culture as Big Business, 8 CHANGE 8, 42 
(1976). 
 58. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. 
 59. See id. at 91-93. 
 60. See id. at 100-01. 
 61. See id. at 117. 
 62. See id. at 120. 
 63. See generally 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32; Jamie 
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent 
Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (2010). Contra Kirkwood 
& Lande, supra note 15, at 191 (arguing that the goal is to protect consumers). 
 64. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506–08 (1974); 
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969); United States v. Third 
Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 182 (1968). 
 65. See generally FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. 
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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unfeasible without an otherwise illegal merger.66  In asserting any 
defense, regardless of its grounds, firms cannot assert that the 
competition itself is unreasonable, thereby justifying the restraint.67 
The Commission, Division, and district courts accept efficiency 
claims to justify otherwise anticompetitive behavior if the gains in 
efficiency outweigh the loss in competition.68  Currently, the efficiency 
defense is in question, as higher courts have placed the bar so high 
that it is nearly impossible to overcome.69  The Commission 
challenged Procter & Gamble’s proposed acquisition of Clorox in 
1967.70  The United States Supreme Court discounted the possibility 
of an efficiency defense, stating in dicta, “Possible economies cannot 
be used as a defense to illegality.  Congress was aware that some 
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it 
struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”71  More than 
thirty years later, in 2001, the Commission challenged a merger 
between Heinz and Milnot Holding Corporation.72  In that case, the 
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that lower courts had allowed efficiency 
defenses; however, the court went on to explain that the lower courts 
also usually found the efficiencies inadequate to overcome antitrust 
implications.73  The court ultimately held that the efficiencies would 
have to be “extraordinary” in order to justify presumptively 
anticompetitive behavior.74  Accordingly, the efficiencies in that case 
were insufficient.75  Thus it is questionable whether efficiencies are a 
legitimate defense; the Supreme Court has not reconsidered its 
position since rejecting the defense in 1967.76 
Cases involving the news have similar holdings.77  In the 1960s, 
newspapers entered into joint operating agreements to increase 
efficiency by consolidating most newspaper operations—except for 
 
 66. See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138. 
 67. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (citing 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as 
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). 
 68. See, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32. 
 69. See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 70. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1967). 
 71. Id. at 580. 
 72. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 711–13 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (challenging a 
duopoly to monopoly merger between baby food manufacturers). 
 73. Id. at 720. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 721. 
 76. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
 77. See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
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the editorial and news departments.78  The Division brought suit 
against the publisher of Tucson’s only evening newspaper and the 
publisher of the city’s only morning and Sunday newspaper who 
formed an agreement that placed both papers under the control of a 
single entity.79  The new firm, which the two original publishers 
controlled equally, managed all aspects of publishing, except for the 
editorial boards.80  The Supreme Court deemed the joint operating 
agreement illegal under the Sherman Act.81  Anxious over a declining 
newspaper industry with an eye towards preserving competing 
editorial voices, Congress passed the Newspaper Preservation Act of 
1970, which effectively overturned Citizen Publishing.82  The Act 
provides merging newspapers with limited antitrust immunity, subject 
to review by the Division—so long as the editorial boards remain 
independent.83 
Another development from Citizen Publishing was the 
modernization of the failing company defense.84  The Court 
rationalized that the inevitable loss to competition combined with 
other losses resulting from the failing firm’s cessation could 
sometimes negate the immediate impact that the merger has on 
competition.85  The defense allows firms to merge despite 
anticompetitive impacts, on the principle that it is the lesser of two 
evils.86  To prevail on a failing company defense, the defendant must 
prove three points87: (1) that the company’s “resources [are] so 
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the 
grave probability of a business failure;”88 (2) that the acquiring firm is 
the only available purchaser;89 and (3) that a successful reorganization 
 
 78. See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133 (1969). 
 79. See id. at 134. 
 80. Id. at 133. 
 81. Id. at 135-36. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–04 (1970); see Mark Fink, Comment, The Newspaper 
Preservation Act of 1970: Help for the Needy or the Greedy?, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 
93, 105–06. 
 83. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–04. 
 84. See 394 U.S. 131 (1969). 
 85. Id. at 136–37. 
 86. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507–08 (1974). 
 87. See Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138–39. 
 88. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 
291 (1961)). 
 89. Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138–39. 
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through bankruptcy is unlikely.90  Taken as a whole, the burden is 
difficult to overcome.91 
Despite the judiciary’s desire to achieve the proper outcome as 
indicated by the intricacies of the case law, the United States 
Supreme Court and lower courts have a difficult time adjudicating 
antitrust actions.92  The combined complexities of the economic 
principles, the sophisticated evidence, and the breadth of the statutes 
all contribute to the courts’ difficulties.  For example, in United States 
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,93 the United States Supreme 
Court found that du Pont de Nemours & Co. could not raise the price 
of cellophane without losing a substantial market share to alternative 
packaging materials.94  Based on that factual finding, the Court 
decided that the firm did not have monopoly power, precluding it 
from monopolizing the market.95  The Court erred, however, in 
assuming that because a firm cannot raise its price any more, the firm 
is not charging a monopoly price already.  Even monopolies face 
reductions in demand when they increase prices.96 
In antitrust cases, where the harm is purely economic, it is only 
logical that plaintiffs use economic theory in determining their 
litigation strategy, considering the probability and value of success 
against the costs of litigating.97  For example, a per se illegal case of 
price fixing will need minimal expert testimony, while a challenge of 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Thomas D. Fina & Vishal Mehta, The Failing Firm Defense: Alive and 
Well, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug11_fina_7_26f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 92. Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 871, 877 (2011). 
 93. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
 94. Id. at 400. 
 95. Id. at 404. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Generally the Agencies utilize their prosecutorial discretion to maximize 
economic efficiency based on economic principles. See Spencer Weber Waller, 
Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. 
L. REV. 1383, 1401–05 (1998).  Both the Commission and the Division have finite 
budgets.  The Commission’s Bureau of Competition 2011 budget was $125,260,000. 
See FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FISCAL YEAR 2012 CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary12.pdf.  The 2011 Division budget was $163,200,000. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION 2012 BUDGET SUMMARY (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fy12-atr-bud-summary.pdf.  Private 
parties also feel the sting of the cost of antitrust litigation. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). 
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quality fixing would require market analysis, research, and economic 
experts to testify regarding the reasonableness of the restraint.98  As a 
result, the Commission and Division are justifiably hesitant to bring 
enforcement actions against quality collusion.99 
Because this Note uses broadcast television as a lens, it is 
important to acknowledge that the Federal Communication 
Commission’s (FCC’s) enforcement authority runs tangentially to 
that of the Division and Commission.100  The FCC’s mandate is to 
ensure that television stations “serve the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity.”101  To that end, the FCC seeks to promote diversity, 
competition, and localism.102  Recently the FCC relaxed local 
television market ownership rules, allowing a single entity to control 
two stations in a single market if there are eight independent stations 
in the market and at least one of the stations is not one of the top four 
in that market group.103  These guidelines, however, are not binding 
on the Commission or the Division.104 
B. The Economic Effects of Collusion 
In response to the expansive statutory breadth, defendants turned 
to economic theory105 to narrow the scope of the statutes.106  
 
 98. Because there have been very few claims brought based on quality collusion 
in the past ten years and none have been successful, calculating the chance of success 
would be extremely speculative. See infra Part II.B. 
 99. See, e.g., BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S 
DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/ 
divestiture.pdf; Dr. Joseph Farrell, Remarks at the Antitrust Law Section Fall Forum 
2011, Upward Price Pressure, Market Definition and Supply Mobility (Oct. 28, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
 100. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–62 (2006). 
 101. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 102. Additionally, the FCC promotes viewpoint, program, outlet, source, minority 
ownership, and gender ownership diversity. FCC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Media Ownership Rules FCC 11-186, 10–12 (2011), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-186A1.pdf. 
 103. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b)(1) (2010) (ranking based on Nielson). 
 104. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 414 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 105. Many of the economic theories and figures in this section are widely accepted 
and generally undisputed.  They are discussed in a slew of books, including: ROBERT 
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (David Alexander et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 2005); ALBERT E. WAUGH, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1947); LORIE 
TARSHIS, THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (Edgar S. Furniss ed., 1947); ROBERT B. 
PETTENGILL, PRICE ECONOMICS (1948); ARTHUR A. THOMPSON JR., ECONOMICS OF 
THE FIRM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Alice Erdman ed., 3d ed. 1981). 
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Economists cannot measure competition directly; they target proxies 
of competition, such as quantity, price, and cost.107  This Section 
explains the relevant, and widely accepted, economic assumptions 
and theories before delving into the negative impact quality collusion 
has on social welfare.108 
Model competitive markets, as represented in Figure 1,109 rely on 
several assumptions: homogenous products; rational participants;110 
perfect information;111 lack of participant market power;112 negligible 
barriers to entry;113 demand decreasing as price increases; and supply 
increasing as price increases.114  The supply curve, also known as the 
 
 106. Although initially unsuccessful, as early as Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), defendants raised the reasonableness of 
restraints, and as early as United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700, 711-712 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), defendants based a defense on economic theory to support the 
reasonableness of an alleged restraint. 
 107. See Jan Boone, A New Way to Measure Competition, 118 ECON. J., 1245, 
1245 (2008) (discussing various means of measuring competition, all of which derive 
from price, quantity, and cost). 
 108. “Social welfare” is an economic term of art representing the aggregate 
wellbeing of individuals within society. JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, 
COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001).  In Figure 1 below, societal welfare 
is the total area encompassed by the consumer and supplier surplus. See generally id. 
 109. See infra Figure 1 and note 118. 
 110. Rational market participants maximize profits. See PETTENGILL, supra note 
105, at 149; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 264–65; TARSHIS, supra note 
105, at 62; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 294–96; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 248. 
 111. “Perfect information” means that all market participants know all of the 
relevant, available, market information. See MIA DE KUIJPER, PROFIT POWER 
ECONOMICS: A NEW COMPETITIVE STRATEGY FOR CREATING SUSTAINABLE WEALTH 
45 (2009); TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 320–47; 
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282. 
 112. In perfect competition, each participant’s contribution to the market is too 
small to influence the market as a whole. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 109–11; 
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 8; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36; 
THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 130–47, 471–72; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282–83.  
Think of each market participant as a grain of sand on a beach—no single grain of 
sand affects the beach as a whole. 
 113. “Strictly speaking, a barrier to entry is a condition that makes the long-run 
costs of a new entrant into a market higher than the long-run costs of the existing 
firms in the market.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227 (2d ed. 
1977).  Examples of entry barriers include, but are not limited to, regulatory 
restrictions, id., and hefty sunk costs. Elizabeth E. Bailey, Papers and Proceedings of 
the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 178, 178 (1981). 
 114. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 358; TARSHIS, supra note 105, 
at 156–59; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 322–45; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 324–51. 
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marginal cost curve, represents the cost of production.115  Supply and 
demand intersect at a market clearing price and quantity, known as 
the equilibrium.116  Buyers in a market may value a product more than 
the market price, and sellers in the market may value the product less 
than the market price; the difference between a party’s internal 
valuation and the market price is the party’s surplus indicated by the 
shaded areas.117 
Figure 1. Basic supply and demand for a product market.
118
 
In a competitive market, individual suppliers lack market power;119 
as illustrated in Figure 2, they face a flat demand curve.120  With 
consumers only willing to buy at or below the market price, firms with 
excess capacity have an incentive to undercut their competitors’ 
 
 115. The marginal cost curve is the collection of points at which suppliers can 
produce.  Each point is a particular quantity that corresponds to a particular price. 
See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 99–102, PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, 
at 85; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 89–103; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 241–42; 
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 264–68. 
 116. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 108; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 
105, at 24; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 214; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 602–20. 
 117. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 184–85; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 128, 300–01; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 75. 
 118. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 23; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 
212; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 29. 
 119. See supra note 112. 
 120. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 273–74; THOMPSON, supra note 
105, at 331–34. 
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prices, thereby temporarily gaining 100% market share, to the point 
that the market price is equal to their marginal cost, where further 
undercutting would only lead to losses.121  Consequently, firms with 
excess supply have an incentive to undercut the other in price—
thereby temporarily gaining 100% market share—up to the point that 
the market price equals the firm’s marginal cost; below that, the firm 
loses money on each sale.122 
Figure 2. Basic supply and demand faced by an individual supplier.
123
 
In competitive markets, firms compete on price and quality, 
eventually reaching an efficient equilibrium.124  When one of those 
factors is fixed, they reach the equilibrium by adjusting the remaining 
variable factor—either quality or price.125  For example, firms 
compete on price to clear their production in commodities markets 
like hard red spring wheat on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, 
 
 121. See supra note 115. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 109–11; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 23 fig.2.3; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36; THOMPSON, supra note 
105, at 130–37, 471–72; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282–83. 
 124. See DAVID BESANKO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 290–95 (2009); 
TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 212; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 29. 
 125. See BESANKO ET AL., supra note 124, at 290–95; PETTENGILL, supra note 105, 
at 123; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 511–22. 
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where quality is fixed.126  Because firms only sell at or above their 
marginal cost, they can only reduce their price if their marginal cost 
decreases.127  Figure 3 illustrates a decrease in suppliers’ marginal 
cost.128  With lower production costs, manufacturers increase 
production, lowering the market price along the existing demand 
curve.129 
Figure 3. Changes in supply (marginal cost).
130
 
 
 126. Flour is graded by its protein content—generally the higher the protein 
content, the better for baking. MGEX Spring Wheat 2010, MGEX, 
http://www.mgex.com/documents/MGEX_HRS_Wheat_2010_v1a_001.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2012).  The protein content for hard red spring wheat must be 
between 13–14% as set by commercial standards. Id.  As a result, buyers of hard red 
spring wheat know what they will receive and can purchase the lowest priced wheat 
on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange rather than comparing protein content relative 
to their prices. Id. 
 127. See supra note 115. 
 128. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210. 
 129. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25 figs.2.4 & 2.5; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WAUGH, supra note 
105, at 259–65. 
 130. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WILLIAM M. WADMAN, VARIABLE 
QUALITY IN CONSUMER THEORY: TOWARD A DYNAMIC MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
OF THE CONSUMER 229–31 (2000); WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65. 
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In contrast, when prices are restricted, firms compete on quality.131  
The airline industry’s prices were restricted prior to deregulation in 
the 1970s, so the airlines competed on quality.132  Firms increased 
quality of service by offering better food and other niceties to 
increase the individual demand.133  A change in quality creates a new 
and distinct product offering, with new supply and demand curves.134  
As represented in Figure 4, these corresponding shifts (the supply and 
the demand changes) create the new equilibrium.135 
Figure 4. Changes in quality.
136
 
If profits rise above the equilibrium, suppliers increase their 
production capacity or new firms enter the market, supply increases, 
 
 131. George W. Douglas & James C. Miller III, Quality Competition, Industry 
Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV., 657, 657–69 (1974). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN supra note 130, at 229–31; 
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65. 
 135. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 108, 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 
supra note 105, at 24–25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210, 214; THOMPSON, supra note 
105, at 602–20; WADMAN supra note 130 at 229–31; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–
65. 
 136. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN, supra note 130, at 229–31; 
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65. 
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and prices return to equilibrium.137  If market characteristics prevent 
self-correction (such as elasticity of supply,138 elasticity of demand,139 
and entry barriers), a monopolist or cartel140 can exercise market 
power by manipulating price, quality, or both to increase profit.141  
Once in place, monopoly pricing decreases consumer welfare: a 
portion transfers to suppliers, and another portion, known as the 
deadweight loss, is lost altogether.142  Because marginal revenue143 
decreases with each unit sold, monopolists maximize profit by 
producing the quantity at which marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, as illustrated in Figure 5 infra.144  Because monopolizing is illegal 
 
 137. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN supra note 130, at 229–31; 
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65. 
 138. Elasticity of supply is the measurement of how supply, for a particular 
product, responds to changes in price. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 32–
33.  Quantity in a market with an elastic supply is more responsive to changes in price 
than a market with an inelastic supply. Id.  For example, in a market where a 1% 
price increase results in a 10% change in quantity, the supply would be more elastic 
than a market where a 1% price increase results in a 2% change in quantity. 
 139. Elasticity of demand is the ratio between a change in price and the 
corresponding change in the quantity demanded. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 
39; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 32; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 116–21; 
THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 121–48; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 90. 
 140. A monopolist or cartel can be defined as “an association of firms with 
common interests, seeking to prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocate 
markets, or share knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 141. “Market power” is the ability of a firm or cartel to increase profit by charging 
supracompetitive price; also barriers to entry enhance market power. See 
PETTENGILL, supra note 105 at 173–75; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 
351–54, 359; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 674–76; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 290, 
445–47; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 244–97.  Barriers to entry are factors that 
dissuade prospective market entrants from entering the market.  These might include 
intellectual property, government regulation, and sunk costs. See PINDYCK & 
RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 340.  The greater the barriers, the greater the cartel’s 
market power. Id. 
 142. The restricted output eliminates the products from the market, thus no one 
obtains the surplus associated with their production. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 
supra note 105, at 304; Joseph G. Sidak, Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 329, 333-34 (1981). 
 143. Marginal revenue is the revenue generated by selling an additional unit.  As 
production increases, the marginal cost increases because the scarcity of inputs 
increases.  For a more complete discussion of marginal revenue, see PETTENGILL, 
supra note 105 at 42–47; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 218–21; TARSHIS, 
supra note 105, at 121218–2122; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 594; WAUGH, supra 
note 105, at 309. 
 144. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 342–44; TARSHIS, supra note 
105, at 676; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 439–46; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 316, 
318. 
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under the Sherman Act,145 the antitrust community must hypothesize 
what effect a proposed merger will have.146  The Agencies determine 
whether the hypothetical post-merger firm could increase profits with 
a small but substantial, non-transitory, increase in price—if so, the 
merger is generally illegal.147 
Figure 5. Monopoly supply and resulting deadweight loss.
148
 
Firms in otherwise competitive markets can form a cartel to 
synthesize a monopoly, by coordinating production and market 
participation to escape the flat demand curve shown in Figure 2, 
allowing the cartel to achieve monopoly-like profits.149  Several factors 
limit cartelization.150  Because a cartel forms a virtual monopoly, the 
 
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 146. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32. 
 147. The 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, do not cite a 
percentage increase; however, a 5–10% threshold is generally accepted. FTC v. CCC 
Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In most contexts, the 
Merger Guidelines consider a price increase of 5% to constitute a SSNIP”); see also 
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2008); California v. 
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 148. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 304; Sidak, supra note 142, at 
333-34. 
 149. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 436, 462–67; JOSHUA GANS, 
STEPHEN KING & GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 380 (2011). 
 150. See Jonathan T. Schmidt, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust 
Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels, 
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 217-18 (2006). 
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market structure must allow monopolization.151  If the market allows 
the cartel, it has several additional hurdles.152  The cartel must be able 
to: agree on the output;153 detect cheating;154 punish cheating;155 and if 
illegal, go undetected.156  If the cartel overcomes these difficulties, 
they reduce social welfare by inflicting deadweight losses, harm firms 
outside of the cartel, and waste resources maintaining the cartel.157  
Although practically impossible to measure accurately, the collective 
social harm caused by cartelization can be significant.158 
 
 151. See Schmidt, supra note 150; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 436, 
462–67; GANS, supra note 149, at 380.  Just like a monopolist, a cartel needs to be able 
to influence the market to be effective. See Schmidt, supra note 150.  The less 
competition from current market participants and potential entrants, the more 
market power a cartel can exert. Id. 
 152. See Schmidt, supra note 150, at 218. 
 153. Agreements between competitors can be difficult to negotiate.  For example, 
firms with different production methods maximize profits with differing outputs, 
often forcing firms to compromise before reaching an agreement.  Additionally, the 
more firms involved, the greater the number of competing interests that need 
placation and policing. See GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 
supra note 105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150. 
 154. Cheating occurs when a firm’s supply exceeds the agreed upon allotment.  
Firms cheat because the individual firm’s profits increase as they sell units beyond the 
agreed allotment, erasing the benefits of the cartel.  In a quality context, firms have 
to be able to accurately and consistently measure the product quality of their 
competitors. See GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 
105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150. 
 155. Once cheating is detected, the cartel must be able to respond by punishing the 
deviant firm by returning to competitive production levels. See generally Brooke 
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 156. Cf., e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 157. To form and enforce agreements, cartels expend resources that could be spent 
increasing productivity rather than restricting it.  Additionally, potential competitors 
may be unable to compete as a result of enlarged barriers to entry.  Thus, any social 
gain their competition would have created by reducing the deadweight loss is either 
lost or the entrant must incur additional costs to overcome the barrier. See HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 382–87 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 1999).  While not technically a social harm, cartels also result in a reduction of 
consumer welfare, because consumers are forced to pay more for the product, 
transferring wealth to the suppliers. Id. 
 158. For a more complete discussion with estimates of the social cost of monopoly, 
see Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 807 (1975). 
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C. Quality and the Local Television Broadcast Stations 
Local broadcast television news (LBTN) is a two-sided market159 
with viewers who consume content on one side, local television 
broadcast stations in the middle, and advertisers that pay for content 
on the other side.160  Although both sides of the market face similar 
structural limitations, the transactions are very different.  The 
transaction between advertisers and stations is simple—advertisers 
pay stations for access to the television stations’ viewers; the more 
viewers, the more the revenue advertising generates per minute for 
the station.161  This section explains this more complex transaction 
between viewers and television stations and how cartels operate in 
the market. 
The competition between television stations for viewers is brutal.162  
Firms pay billions of dollars for content to increase viewership, 
because having more viewers means more advertising revenue.163  For 
example, exclusive rights to broadcast the 2011 Super Bowl, which 
captured the attention of 111,000,000 viewers, netted Fox over $3 
million per commercial spot.164  Advertisers would have been 
unwilling to pay Fox the same amount if Fox and NBC simulcast the 
event and shared the viewers; exclusivity made the advertisements 
more expensive.  As a result, the Super Bowl and other NFL content 
cost CBS, NBC, and Fox $3.1 billion per year.165 
 
 159. A two-sided market is a platform where one firm must interact with two 
networks to generate demand from either of them. See David S. Evans, The 
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 336 
(2003).  For example, HMOs are in a two-sided market where the insurance company 
acts as a platform, bringing together a network of patients with a network of health 
care professionals. 
 160. See Reed, supra note 7, at 28. 
 161. The elasticity between the number of views and the advertising rates charged 
is 0.83. See Kenneth C. Wilber, A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television 
Advertising and Viewing Markets, 27 MARKETING SCI., 356, 372 (2008).  In other 
words, if the number of viewers for a particular show increases by 100%, the rate for 
advertising on the show would increase by 83%. See generally id. 
 162. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Ben Klaymen, Super Bowl Packs in Record U.S. TV Viewer Total, REUTERS, 
Feb. 7, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-superbowl-
ratings-idUSTRE7163GS20110207. 
 165. Joe Flint, NFL Signs TV Rights Deals with Fox, NBC and CBS, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/15/business/la-fi-ct-nfl-deals-
20111215.  The deal, which covers nine years and includes rights to the Super Bowl, 
splits evenly among the three networks. 
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When analyzing the LBTN, it is important to recognize that supply 
and demand are constrained.166  On the supply side, significant entry 
barriers, such as the market structure and legal restrictions, restrict 
supply.167  Statutory restrictions also prevent or restrict entry by new 
stations.168  In combination, firms are unlikely to enter the market in 
response to a small but significant increase in price, making it more 
likely that such a change would be profitable. 
The demand for broadcast television is inelastic.169  Alternate 
media sources such as cable television, print, radio, and the Internet 
exist but they lack sufficient interchangeability with broadcast 
television to curtail anticompetitive behavior in the market.170  
Internet access, newspapers, and cable television are more expensive 
than broadcast television.  They deliver different content.  
Newspapers and radio lack video.  Internet video quality lags behind 
television.171  The broadcast industry, among others, might argue that 
more people are turning to the Internet for news content; however, 
broadband Internet access currently lacks ease of use, market 
penetration,172 and content breadth to counter a cartel’s power.173  In 
 
 166. See infra notes 167–79 and accompanying text. 
 167. The vertically integrated market forces firms to enter two markets 
simultaneously—content production and content distribution—and pay the sunk 
costs for both.  Television broadcast stations’ allotments are divided up and limited 
by geographic areas. 47 C.F.R. § 73.622 (2011). See generally Ownership Chart: The 
Big Six, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart/main (last visited Nov. 
13, 2012) (General Electric owns NBC and Universal Studios; Walt Disney owns 
ABC Television Network, Touchstone, Miramax Walt Disney Pictures, and Pixar 
Animation Studios; News Corp. owns Fox Broadcasting Company, 20th Century Fox, 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, and Blue Sky Studios; CBS Corporation has major holdings 
in the CW network with Time Warner).  The current cost of content could bankrupt 
a small nation, let alone prohibit all but the wealthiest potential firms from entering 
the market.  Compare, for example, the nearly $3.1 billion that CBS, NBC, and Fox 
pay annually to provide NFL game coverage, Flint, supra note 165, with Greenland’s 
gross domestic product of $2.1 billion. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2011), available 
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/index.html. 
 168. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.622 (2012). 
 169. See infra text accompanying notes 170–73. 
 170. See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 171. If Internet video does not lack quality in transmission, then it does in 
experience, as computer screens tend to be smaller than television screens. 
 172. Only 17% of people obtain their local news from the internet, compared to 
61% for local broadcast television. Yanich, supra note 1, at 8.  Moreover, the fact that 
a broadcast television cartel lacks market power with one market segment does not 
preclude profitable market power on the whole. See generally Press Release, FTC, 
FTC Consent Order Settles Charges that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild 
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sum, a broadcast television cartel could probably increase its profit by 
charging supracompetitive prices. 
Although quantity and price are the standard units of measurement 
in economics,174 the traditional notions of quantity and price fail in the 
market between viewers and broadcast stations.175  Price fails because 
no money changes hands between viewers and stations; viewers pay 
by watching commercials.  Quantity fails because supply is effectively 
binary; firms do or do not broadcast.  Unique minutes of quality-
adjusted programming and the level of advertising synthesize the 
traditional concepts of quantity and price, respectively. 
A unique minute of quality-adjusted programming has three parts: 
a minute of programming; a level of uniqueness; and a level of 
quality.  Programming is only unique to the extent that it increases 
the supply of content.  If firms share aspects of content, such as 
scripts, video feeds, and on-air personalities, or rebroadcast content at 
a different time, their content is no longer unique, and the minutes of 
unique programming are reduced proportionally to the redundancy.  
Separate from the quantity of unique programming is quality.  
Broadcast television’s primary role is to entertain and inform viewers; 
the better it accomplishes these goals, the higher its quality.176  
Differences in programming, such as the video feed quality and the 
talent of the news anchors, influence the ability of the program to 
entertain and inform.  As a result, minutes of unique programming 
are unequal—they need adjustment to account for differences in 
quality. 
 
Oats Was Anticompetitive (Mar. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/wholefoods.shtm. 
 173. The antitrust enforcement agencies typically only project two years out when 
forecasting the reasonableness of a restraint. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 27.  The timeline for the Internet to be a strong 
enough force in the broadcast television market to eliminate a cartel’s power is 
probably more than two years. 
 174. See supra Part I.B. 
 175. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 176. As prescribed by regulation, the purpose of broadcast television is “to offer 
services of any nature, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.624 (2012).  Although in reference to radio stations, the 
FCC required the station to dedicate a nominal amount of time to non-entertainment 
content, the requirement was eliminated in 1981. In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 
F.C.C.2d 968, 975, 983 (1981); Glenn P. Harris, Federal Communications 
Commission: Deregulation of Radio Revisited, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 887–88 
(1987). 
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Without money changing hands, the level of advertising functions 
as price’s proxy.177  Audiences tolerate the intrusion of advertising in 
exchange for content, and broadcasters tolerate providing content in 
exchange for the viewers’ willingness to watch advertisements.178  
Even though the viewers’ preference to avoid advertising is neither 
absolute nor static (for example, some viewers watch the Super Bowl 
expressly for the advertisements,179 which inverts the typical demand 
structure), firms do have to pay attention to the quantity of 
advertisements.180  Just as farmers have to set the “right price” for 
hard red spring wheat, broadcast stations have to set the right level of 
advertising.  Based on the same economic models, if there are too 
many advertisements, fewer people will watch them, driving the per-
advertisement price to a point where the station will no longer be 
profitable.  On the other hand, if there is too little advertising, the 
per-advertisement price required to maintain the station’s 
profitability would be too high for advertisers to afford.181  The level 
of advertising, as discussed in this Note, accounts for the minutes and 
intrusiveness of advertising.182 
Using the price (advertising level) and quantity (minutes of unique, 
quality adjusted programming) proxies, demand is measured by the 
minutes of unique quality-adjusted programming viewers consume at 
a given level of advertising.183  The price that viewers pay (the level of 
advertising) is relatively constant.184  Thus, with the cost of content 
relatively even across stations, consumers maximize their surplus by 
 
 177. GENEVA OVERHOLSER & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, THE PRESS 417 (2005). 
 178. See Wilber, supra note 161, at 376. 
 179.  Chad Brooks, Employers Beware: Fans Wiling to Miss Work, Weddings and 
More for Super Bowl, FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://smallbusiness.foxbusiness.com/legal-hr/2012/01/27/employers-beware-fans-
willing-to-miss-work-weddings-and-more-for-super-bowl/ (“Nearly 40 percent of 
those surveyed tune in primarily for the commercials . . . .”). 
 180. See Super Bowl Ads Rival Game Again in 2012, According to Hanon 
McKendry Poll Conducted by Harris Interactive, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/super-bowl-ads-rival-game-again-in-2012-
according-to-hanon-mckendry-poll-conducted-by-harris-interactive-138660569.html. 
 181. See supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text. 
 182. It is interesting to note that a broadcast station’s marginal revenue curve, as it 
relates to advertisers, is particularly steep.  The curve is so steep because, in addition 
to the standard price reduction accompanying any increase in supply, the additional 
minutes of advertising degrades the quality of the programming, reducing the 
number of viewers, and making the advertising time inherently less valuable.  In 
other words, having more commercials makes most TV programming less enjoyable. 
 183. See generally supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Wilber, supra note 161, at 376. 
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choosing the highest quality programming.  In the aggregate, with 
consumers individually maximizing their surplus, content with the 
highest viewership is the “highest quality.”185  Therefore, Nielsen 
ratings, as a measure of viewership, are possibly the best available 
proxy for quality.186 
As represented by the marginal revenue curve in Figure 6, supply is 
the willingness of firms to produce unique minutes of quality adjusted 
programming at a given level of advertising.187  A strong positive 
correlation exists between minutes of unique quality-adjusted 
programming and production costs.188  The correlation is the product 
of the cost of producing unique programming, as opposed to 
rebroadcasting the same content, and the cost of producing high 
quality programming.189  As a result, in the LBTN market, based on 
the model in Figure 5, to achieve monopoly like profits, cartels have 
to coordinate their efforts to reduce the minutes of unique, quality-
adjusted programming to the point where it intersects with the level 
of advertising, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Firms have instituted SSAs, which coordinate the sharing of 
services between broadcast stations to increase efficiency.190  To take 
full advantage of SSAs, broadcast stations eliminate as many 
redundancies as possible, including news crews, scriptwriters, 
reporters, video technicians, news anchors, and studio space.191  The 
result is a reduction in the uniqueness of their broadcasts for each of 
those factors. 
 
 185. Comment: Reality Television, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at A16.  On some 
level it pains the author to categorize certain shows as high quality television, yet the 
purpose of television is largely its entertainment value, and as the adage goes, 
“there’s no accounting for taste.” See, e.g., Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire 
(FOX television broadcast Feb. 15, 2000). 
 186. See Nielsen Holdings N.V., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.nielsen.com/sitelets/yir/pdfs/2011_nielsen_10k.pdf. 
 187. See generally supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text. 
 188. For an extreme example of the effect that price has on quality, compare Flint, 
supra note 165 (noting the combined $3.1 billion per year that CBS, NBC, and Fox 
pay for NFL coverage), with Darren Rovell, First Interview with Vince from 
ShamWow!, CNBC, (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/28880253/ 
First_Interview_with_Vince_from_ShamWow (highlighting that the original 
ShamWow commercial cost $20,000 to produce). 
 189. See supra note 188. 
 190. See Reed, supra note 7, at 3. 
 191. See Yanich, supra note 1, at 22, 33-34, 63, 73. 
MCMILLAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:48 PM 
1920 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
Figure 6. A LBTN cartel’s output restriction. 
One type of SSA, known as a local news sharing agreement 
(LNSA), coordinates the sharing of news coverage between 
competing stations.192  Even in smaller markets, the cost of producing 
a news program approaches a million dollars a year.  Stations assert 
that the money LNSAs save benefits the public by allowing more 
coverage of a wider variety of topics.  Some stations, appearing to 
assert the failing firm defense, claim that the agreements allow their 
continuing operation.193  The actual cost savings are undisclosed and 
difficult to estimate; however, various firms have asserted that they 
allow operations that would otherwise be financially unfeasible.194  
Although formed in the name of efficiency, LNSAs can have a 
significant anticompetitive impact.  LNSAs coordinate participating 
firms’ output and allow the participants to reduce or eliminate 
competition for exclusive content.195  Once an agreement is in place, 
 
 192. See Yanich, supra note 1, at 6. 
 193. See Stelter, supra note 2; Hillary Atkin, As Local Sharing Progresses, New 
Concerns Emerge, TVWEEK (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.tvweek.com/news/ 
2009/08/as_local_sharing_progresses_ne.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2011); Honolulu 
Stations in Shared Services Deal, TVNEWSCHECK (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2009/08/18/34810/honolulu-stations-in-shared-
services-deal. 
 194. See Atkin, supra note 193. 
 195. Yanich, supra note 1, at 24, 35. 
MCMILLAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:48 PM 
2012] QUALITY COLLUSION 1921 
the number of unique and local stories declines although the length of 
news programming increases.196 
Independent stations have the same effect on a cartel as a 
cheater.197  The cartel restricts supply of content driving up the per 
unit price.  In response, independent firms will increase supply until 
their marginal cost equals their marginal revenue, increasing their 
profit at the cartel’s expense.198  For example, a hypothetical market 
has three firms, two of which are in a cartel.  The firms in the cartel 
have a composite 60% share of the market by producing better 
quality content at a lower cost than the independent station.  The 
cartel, simulcasting identical content, evenly divides the 60%—thus 
each firm receives 30% of the market.  The non-participating firm 
supplies the remaining 40% of the market.  This does not mean that 
member firms’ profits are lower than they would be without the 
cartel—so long as the savings on production are substantial enough, 
net profits can still increase.  According to Nielsen ratings, in markets 
with SSAs, independent stations outperform the SSA.199 
II.  THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ANTITRUST LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
The statutes prohibit all unreasonable restraints on trade, 
regardless of whether they are based on price, quantity, or quality.200  
To determine the veracity that quality collusion is pursued, the 
author, on September 1, 2012, conducted a search of all U.S. District, 
Circuit, and Supreme Court cases within the LexisNexis Trade Cases 
database that included the term “antitrust” and “collusion” extending 
back to September 1, 2002.201  The search returned 806 results.202  The 
author then reviewed the cases for instances which raised quality 
 
 196. See id. at 24. 
 197. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 198. See generally GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra 
note 105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150. 
 199. Yanich, supra note 1, at 24, 35, 45.  The fact that stations accept lower ratings 
in exchange for market share indicates that the cost savings created by the SSAs are 
substantial. 
 200. See supra Part I.A. 
 201. LEXIS NEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (follow Area of Law—By Topic” 
hyperlink; then follow “Antitrust & Trade” hyperlink; then follow “US Supreme, 
Appellate, District and Claims Court Trade Cases” hyperlink; then search “antitrust 
and collusion” from “09/01/2002” to “09/01/2012”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
 202. Id. 
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collusion as an issue.203  One percent of cases focused on quality 
collusion as a primary issue and less than three percent of the cases 
reviewed mentioned quality as a secondary issue.  Part A of this 
section discusses the probable justifications for this non-enforcement.  
Part B then discusses how the probable justifications for non-
enforcement are inapplicable in certain markets. 
A. Why the Antitrust Community Should Ignore Quality 
Collusion 
Probable justifications for non-enforcement of quality collusion 
stem from the fact that quantifying quality is difficult, making cases 
involving quality expensive and difficult to win.  In addition, quality 
adjustments change the demand curve, possibly negating any societal 
harm.  Finally, in many cases, standardization enhances competition. 
Many products lend themselves to quality quantification.  For 
example, a sheet of standard copy paper is eight-and-a-half by eleven 
inches—deviant paper is easy to detect.  Many products however, are 
not easily compared.  Product quality can be difficult to measure 
because of the product’s abstract nature, complexity, or its 
consumers’ idiosyncratic preferences.  Clearly, the more abstract a 
product is, the more difficult it is to determine its quality.204  Product 
complexity also makes quantification difficult as different factors bear 
different weights on the product’s overall quality.  Moreover, certain 
factors are synergistic, while others are antagonistic.205  Subjectivity 
imposes an enormous burden on quantifying quality, potentially 
bringing even a simple product’s quality into dispute.  What some 
people consider excellent, others consider unacceptable, and because 
 
 203. The review was limited to reading one hundred words on each side of the 
word “quality” to determine whether quality could be at issue.  If it was likely raised 
as an issue, the author read the entire opinion to determine whether a party raised a 
restraint on quality as an issue. 
 204. Consider the quality of abstract products, such as education.  U.S. NEWS bases 
40% of their law school rankings on peer and legal professionals’ reputational 
assessments of the schools. 
 205. For example, imagine Dean Munching is considering whether to order a pizza 
from Anthony’s or Bobby’s.  Anthony’s uses premium ingredients for the pizza crust 
and a homemade sauce, but they use canned toppings.  Bobby’s uses premium 
ingredients for the crust and fresh toppings, but the sauce is from a can.  To 
determine pizza quality, Dean Munching considers each of the inputs that make up 
the pizza, weighs them according to their importance to her, and then aggregates 
them to determine each pizza’s total quality. 
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subjectivity is infinitely variable, ultimately even price is subjective.206  
Consumers’ conflicting opinions on quality extend from airplanes to 
cars, computers, and pizza.  Thus, quantifying quality can be 
difficult.207 
Although quality collusion claims are essentially non-existent, 
quality has been at issue in antitrust disputes.208  For example, to 
define the relevant market,209 in Federal Trade Commission v. Whole 
Foods Market, Inc., the Commission attempted to block a merger 
between Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) and Wild Oats 
Markets, Inc. (Wild Oats) with a temporary restraining order.210  Part 
of the Commission’s argument required the court to differentiate 
between premium grocery stores211 and standard grocery stores.212  
The Commission argued, based on Whole Foods’s internal 
documents, that the merger would provide Whole Foods, as a 
premium grocery store, with monopoly power in several geographic 
areas.213  The Commission failed to persuade the trial court that 
Safeway and Whole Foods operated in different markets and service 
different customers.214  Because of the Commission’s difficulty, the 
 
 206. To a person living below the poverty line, ten dollars could represent three or 
four meals, while a person with income four times the level of poverty might spend 
that much on a can of soda at a baseball game.  Clearly, a can of soda is not as 
valuable to the person at the baseball game as four meals are to the person living 
below the poverty line. 
 207. Continuing with Dean Munching, see supra note 205, she is still contemplating 
where to order her pizza.  She is planning a luncheon with a colleague—Professor 
Picky—who happens to be a pizza connoisseur that she would like to impress.  Dean 
Munching and Professor Picky both weigh the crust as the most important aspect of a 
pizza.  Because both Bobby’s and Anthony’s use premium ingredients in their crusts, 
Dean Munching must continue her examination further.  Professor Picky loves fresh 
tomato and basil toppings while Dean Munching prefers a hearty, flavored sauce.  In 
this instance, Dean Munching, in an effort to impress, defers to Professor Picky’s 
pizza preference and orders from Bobby’s.  Clearly, no matter how you slice it, 
people have different perceptions of what constitutes better pizza. 
 208. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 210. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 211. Examples of such grocery stores include Whole Foods and Wild Oats. Id. at 4–
5. 
 212. Examples cited by the court include: Safeway, Giant Eagle, Giant Food, Stop 
& Shop, Harris Teeter, Food Lion, and Publix. Id. at 12. 
 213. See id. at 19. 
 214. See id. at 49.  After the Commission lost at trial, the merger was 
consummated.  The Commission continued litigating the case. Id.  More than two 
years after the merger plans were announced, the Commission and Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. entered into a consent decree which required the divesture of several 
stores as well as intellectual property. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Consent Order 
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Community likely has legitimate concerns over its ability to define 
quality sufficiently before a court.215 
The benefit of certain horizontal quality agreements outweighs the 
harm.216  If challenged, courts would likely treat beneficial restraints 
as reasonable.217  Weighing in favor of horizontal agreements on 
quality are factors such as: (1) reducing information and transactional 
costs;218 (2) enhancing network effects;219 (3) eliminating free riders;220 
and (4) leveraging resources.221 
Product standardization can reduce information and transaction 
costs.222  In markets with product differentiation, consumers research 
and compare various products, calculate the various options’ worth, 
and negotiate transactions separately to account for these variables 
before making an informed buying decision.223  In markets with 
standardization, consumers can understand and compare price 
differential more easily.224  The clearest example of this is in 
commodities markets such as hard red spring wheat, where buyers 
compare a standardized product and make purchasing decisions 
based solely on price.225  In this and other similar markets, firms must 
match or beat competitors’ prices to clear their production. 
Standardization can help consumers with enhanced network effects 
and eliminate lock-in costs.226  Consider telephones—a standard 
telephone exchange extends the market to include everyone with a 
 
Settles Charges that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild Oats Was 
Anticompetitive (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2009/03/wholefoods.shtm. 
 215. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 270 (8th Cir. 1995) 
 216. See Posner, supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 217. One example of a potentially beneficial restraint was seen in a recent case, 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).  In Leegin, 
the Court ruled that vertical price restraints were no longer per se illegal because 
sufficient inter-brand price competition could prevent monopolistic prices, and the 
restraints could reduce free-riding, enhancing non-price competition. Id. at 895–900. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29; infra note 227 and accompanying 
text. 
 219. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
 220. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. 
 221. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. 
 222. See infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text. 
 223. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 168–70, 618. 
 224. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; infra note 226 and accompanying 
text. 
 225. See supra note 126. 
 226. This is especially true for consumable products related to capital 
expenditures—for example, razor blades, printer cartridges, bolts, car parts, etc. 
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telephone—regardless of a consumer’s individual service provider.  
The larger network enhances consumer utility, increasing overall 
demand.  Likewise, standardization reduces consumers’ lock-in costs 
by allowing consumers to make subsequent purchases from any 
participating firm, making the aftermarket competitive.227 
Standardization can also eliminate or reduce free-riding.228  Firms 
are reticent to invest when a free-rider problem exists.229  They either 
fear that their competition will benefit without incurring the costs, or 
they believe they can free ride and derive the benefit without the 
associated costs.230  Horizontal agreements can limit free riders and 
their negative impact, by sharing the expenses amongst the firms 
certain to benefit.  Examples of legitimate agreements that limit free 
riders include research and development for Blu-Ray Discs,231 and 
advertising campaigns for pork232 and milk.233  Thus, by limiting free 
riders, firms are willing to undertake programs that would not make 
sense for a firm acting alone.234 
 
 227. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–70 
(1992) (explaining that even if a firm lacks market power in the primary market, it 
may be able to exert market power in a secondary market).  Bolts are another 
example where standardization increased consumer utility. See generally William 
Sellers, The United States Standard Screw Threads (1864), ASME, 
http://anniversary.asme.org/ 
2005landmarks3.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).  Initially, independent 
manufacturers made bolts with unique threading until the Franklin Institute pushed 
for standardization. Id.  The standardization eliminated supplier lock–in, allowing 
companies to repair machines without having to use custom bolts or order specific 
bolts from the original manufacturer. Id. 
 228. Free-riding is when market participants receive economic benefits without 
incurring the related cost. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 229. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105 at 668. 
 230. See id. 
 231. Blu-Ray was developed with support from more than 180 companies including 
LG Electronics Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Sony Corporation, Twentieth 
Century Fox, Walt Disney Pictures, and Warner Bros. Entertainment. See Blu-ray 
FAQ, BLU-RAY.COM, http://www.blu-ray.com/faq/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 232. Although created through an act of Congress eliminating questions of 
antitrust legality, this horizontal agreement of the National Pork Board, which 
charges pork producers a 0.4% surcharge on every pound of pork sold, gave us the 
wonderful tag line: “Pork: The Other White Meat.” See About the National Pork 
Board, NAT’L PORK BOARD, http://www.porkbeinspired.com/AboutTheNational 
PorkBoard.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 233. The expression “Got Milk?” was a creation of the California Milk Processor 
Board, which charges milk processors in California a $.03 surcharge on each gallon 
sold to fund the advertising campaign. See CALIFORNIA MILK PROCESSOR BOARD, 
http://www.gotmilk.com/ (follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 234. See, e.g., supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
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Horizontal agreements can also allow firms to pool resources and 
leverage various individual firms’ strengths to accomplish projects 
beyond the reach of an individual firm.235  For example, contractual 
agreements between pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and 
universities form the basis for research alliances and joint research 
projects that develop new drugs.236  By integrating their efforts, firms 
can leverage their expertise, access to capital markets, and intellectual 
property,237 while limiting their exposure to the cost of a failed drug, 
which can reach almost a billion dollars.238  It also gives companies 
access to scarce resources.239 
Between the potential costs and the potential benefits of horizontal 
non-price agreements, net economic effect can be difficult to 
ascertain.240  When confronted with antitrust cases that are difficult to 
decide, courts have a tendency to utilize the ROR.241  Accordingly, 
courts would probably utilize the ROR to determine the legality of a 
quality-based agreement.  With the burden of proof in their favor, 
defendants will likely prevail.242 
B. Why the Antitrust Community Should Not Ignore Quality 
Collusion 
Cartels can inflict a severe deadweight loss on society.243  The 
antitrust statutes are broad enough to encompass and prohibit quality 
collusion in addition to the traditional price and quantity 
restrictions.244  Guidance provided by the Commission and the 
 
 235. See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
 236. See infra notes 238–40. 
 237. For example, the differences in firm expertise could involve leveraging a 
university’s clinical research facility with financial assistance from a pharmaceutical 
company that has greater access to financial markets. 
 238. By allowing firms to diversify their research, they are able to limit downside 
risk while maintaining a similar long-term upside potential.  The adage, “Don’t put 
all your eggs in one basket,” promotes diversification.  For example, Pfizer put a lot 
of eggs in one basket when it invested almost $1 billion on Torcetrapib before 
deciding the drug was a failure. See Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Pfizer Shares 
Plummet on Loss of a Promising Heart Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05pfizer.html. 
 239. By working with hospitals, drug companies have greater access to patients for 
their clinical trials, as well as doctors to run the trials. 
 240. See supra notes 227–40 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007). 
 242. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 158. 
 244. See supra Part I.A. 
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Division reinforces this assertion—it even indicates that quality has 
moved from a trivial factor to an important consideration of the 
Agencies.245  In certain markets, the interactions between price, 
quantity, and quality allow firms to extract monopoly profits by 
manipulating quality instead of quantity or price.246  Therefore, a gap 
exists between what enforcement agencies should pursue and what 
they do pursue.247 
The anticompetitive impact of LNSAs on viewers has gone 
unchallenged by the Commission and the Division for at least ten 
years.248  The FCC has stated that it is investigating the matter.249  
However, this is not to say that the industry has escaped all 
enforcement.  On the contrary, there have been numerous antitrust 
actions filed—the actions simply ignore the antitrust violations’ 
impact on viewers.250 
In 2011 the Division filed a civil complaint to enjoin the merger 
between Cumulus Media, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation, 
two radio broadcast companies.251  The Division’s complaint,252 
competitive impact statement,253 and consent decree254 focused on the 
 
 245. Compare 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35 (using the 
word “quality” five times, but only in one instance—a footnote, expressing concern 
over a potential negative impact on quality), with 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 32 (using the word “quality” six times in all, but one instance 
expressing concern over the negative impact of a merger on quality).  The increased 
prominence of quality and the negative effects that mergers can have on it suggests 
that the Commission and the Division agree that quality manipulation is or can be 
illegal. 
 246. See supra Part II.B. 
 247. In addition to the research described in Part II.B., infra, the author conducted 
a search of the Commission and the Division’s enforcement activity on their 
respective websites.  The Commission’s website allows searches of documents 
extending back through 1996.  Since 1996, the only document to contain the term 
“broadcast television” concerned cable television companies. FTC Competition 
Enforcement Database, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/index.shtml (last updated 
Oct. 19, 2011).  This is not to say that the media has been free of antitrust 
enforcement. 
 248. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Stetler, supra note 2. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Complaint, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274800/274819.pdf. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 
1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274800/274828.pdf.  “Competitive impact 
statements” are summaries of the Division’s economic findings regarding a particular 
case. See, e.g., id. 
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sale of radio advertising, while remaining silent on the effect that the 
merger would have had on listeners.  There was no discussion in any 
of the documents as to whether the merger would adversely affect the 
quality of programming on the stations.255 
Three years earlier, in 2008, Raycom acquired three television 
broadcast stations from Lincoln Financial Media Company.256  One of 
the stations was in a market where Raycom was already present, 
giving Raycom ownership of two of the four broadcast stations in that 
market.257  In response to the consolidation, the Division filed for an 
injunction.258  While remaining silent on the impact the merger would 
have on programming, the competitive impact statement stated that 
continued ownership by Raycom of one of the acquired stations 
“would substantially lessen competition in the sale of broadcast 
television spot advertising”259 in that market.  The final judgment 
required divestiture260 of the station and prevented local marketing or 
joint sales agreements between Raycom and the divested station—the 
stations appear to be free to engage in LNSAs.261 
Prior to those cases, the Division filed to block a media 
consolidation in the Salt Lake City broadcast television market.262  
 
 254. United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f279100/279195.pdf.  In an 
antitrust setting, “consent decrees” are agreements whereby a firm consents to act in 
accordance with the demands of the Commission. See, e.g., In re Whole Foods Mkt., 
Inc., No. 9324, 2009 WL 1557334 (F.T.C. May 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090529wfdo.pdf. 
 255. See generally United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2011); Complaint, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-
cv-01619 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. 
Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011). 
 256. Complaint, United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f236600/236613.pdf. 
 257. See generally id. 
 258. Id. at 1. 
 259. Competitive Impact Statement at 2, United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No. 
1:08-cv-01510 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f236600/236618.pdf. 
 260. Specific performance in antitrust, has included—as it did in this case—
mandatory divestment, as well as requiring the operations to continue as long as they 
remain fiscally possible. United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510 
(D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ 
f240100/240199.pdf. 
 261. See generally id. 
 262. See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, United States v. News 
Corporation Ltd., No. 1:01CV0077 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f8000/8039.pdf. 
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The News Corporation (owner of KTVX-TV, a Fox Television 
affiliate station) proposed an acquisition of Chris Craft (owner of 
KSTU-TV, an ABC affiliate station), which would have placed 40% 
of the Salt Lake City broadcast television spot advertising market 
under common ownership.263  Again the Division challenged the 
merger because the merger would substantially lessen competition in 
the broadcast television advertising market.264  The complaint and the 
competitive impact statement were silent on the merger’s potential 
impact on quality.265  The final judgment required divestiture of the 
station and prevented local marketing or joint sales agreements 
between Raycom and the divested station—again, the stations appear 
to be free to engage in LNSAs.266 
The lack of concern exists in non-broadcast media as well.  In 2004, 
the Daily Gazette Company and MediaNews Group, Inc. 
consummated a merger.267  In 2007, the Division filed an action to 
unwind the transaction, alleging that the merger eliminated price and 
non-price competition.268  The reduction in non-price competition was 
manifested in the termination of a Saturday publication, the reduction 
of local news stories, and the elimination of several sections from the 
newspapers.269  In 2010, the companies agreed to a consent decree that 
unwound the merger.270  The consent decree included specific 
performance on price requirements to rebuild the diminished 
subscriber base; however, the eliminated Saturday publication, the 
reduction of local news stories, and the elimination of several sections 
from the newspapers were untouched.271  Again, price concerns 
 
 263. Id. at 2. 
 264. Id. at 8. 
 265. Id. at 1; Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. News Corp. Ltd., No. 
1:01CV00771 (D.D.C. May 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f8300/8374.pdf. 
 266. See generally United States v. News Corp. Ltd., No. 1:01CV0077, 2001 WL 
34038534 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2001). 
 267. Complaint at 1, United States v. Daily Gazette Co., No. 2:07-0329 (S.D. W. 
Va. May 22, 2007), 2007 WL 1571956. 
 268. Id. at 2. 
 269. Id. at 3. 
 270. United States v. Daily Gazette Co., No. 2:07-0329, 2007 WL 7575700 (S.D. W. 
Va. Oct. 18, 2007). 
 271. Id. 
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trumped quality.  The newspapers currently co-publish a single 
weekend edition.272 
Clearly, under the right circumstances, firms are able to form 
cartels and charge supracompetitive prices.273  Participating firms find 
ways to increase their profit, with little concern regarding the effect 
on the consumer (listener, viewer, reader, etc.).274  The statutes, 
however, also cover agreements on quality just as much as those on 
price.275  Although the Agencies’ guidance and case law indicate that 
quality agreements are illegal,276 there appears to be little in the way 
of enforcement action by the Community.277 
III.  SUGGESTIONS FOR CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LAW 
AND THE PRACTICE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Quality collusion is a highway with vague and infrequent signs and 
no police.  Firms have no idea how fast they can drive or how 
expensive tickets are.  In fact, they probably dismiss the possibility of 
a citation altogether.  As a result, they freely collude on quality in 
violation of the antitrust laws with a resulting increase in social harm.  
While a multitude of solutions exists, this Note discusses four of them: 
(A) increase quality collusion enforcement; (B) develop strategies to 
quantify quality; (C) adopt a framework to adjudicate quality 
collusion claims; and (D) conduct retrospective analyses of the 
aforementioned strategies. 
A. Increase Enforcement Actions Against Quality Collusion 
To reduce quality collusion, the Commission and Division should 
increase enforcement against quality collusion by (1) increasing the 
prominence and depth of quality analyses in actions brought 
primarily on price; and (2) by bringing actions based entirely on 
quality collusion.278  The increase in enforcement would reduce 
quality collusion through direct intervention against firms involved 
with quality collusion.  An increase in enforcement will also act as a 
 
 272. As of the writing of this Note, there is a joint weekend publication between 
the two companies. See CHARLESTON NEWSPAPERS, https://iservices.cnpapers.com 
(last visited July 5, 2012). 
 273. See supra Part I.B. 
 274. See supra Part I.B. 
 275. See supra Part I.A. 
 276. See supra Part I.A. 
 277. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra Part II.B. 
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deterrent, signaling that the enforcement agencies will not tolerate 
anticompetitive quality collusion.  Concerns over increased 
enforcement such as its cost and overly constrictive self-regulation are 
reasonable, yet improbable. 
By pursuing quality collusion within claims that would have 
previously been brought exclusively on charges of price or output 
collusion, enforcement agencies can maximize the deterrent effect of 
their actions.  For example, the Raycom complaint279 only cited the 
effect the merger would have on the advertising market.  The 
Commission could have discussed the importance of the merger’s 
impact on the programming quality as well, to signal its broader 
focus.  Because enforcement action was already underway, the 
additional enforcement cost of pursuing the quality issue would be 
minimal.  An increase in enforcement will bolster the current anemic 
case law, thus providing firms with a clearer delineation between pro- 
and anticompetive horizontal agreements.  This move would enhance 
self-regulation as well. 
Increasing enforcement prevents firms from continuing 
anticompetitive behavior.  Being the subject of an antitrust 
enforcement action costs time, money,280 and public relations.281  
Rational firms will reduce their exposure to antitrust actions.  
Although firms will still assume some risk of defending antitrust 
actions based on their cost-benefit analyses, additional enforcement 
will shift the equation and increase self-regulation that in turn will 
reduce the future burden on the Agencies, enhance competition, and 
increase social welfare. 
It is true that increasing enforcement increases litigation costs.  A 
single antitrust case is extremely expensive,282 and it is unlikely that 
the Commission and the Division’s current budgets could support a 
 
 279. See Complaint, United States v. Raycom Media, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510 
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008). 
 280. See supra Part I.A. 
 281. Antitrust complaints connote the idea that the company is taking advantage of 
its customers, which causes public relations issues.  For example, Microsoft 
experienced major public relations setbacks as a result of their antitrust woes. See 
Elizabeth Corcoran, For Gates, Fight May Prove Costly, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/microsoft/stories/ 
microtale19.htm. 
 282. The Division spent more than $50,000,000 related to the Microsoft antitrust 
litigation. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Declan 
McCullagh, DOJ Pushes Case Against MS, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2001), 
http://www.wired.com/news/antitrust/0,1551,41163,00.html. 
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significant increase in antitrust litigation.283  A modest increase in 
funding, however, could justify itself by enhancing self-regulation, 
clarifying case law, and encouraging firms to self-regulate out of fear 
of an enforcement action. 
Concern about overzealous self-regulation is rarely a worthwhile 
consideration.284  If enforcement went too far, firms might shy away 
from aggressive procompetitive strategies fearing costly litigation.  
The counterargument is that increased enforcement will clarify case 
law, helping firms conform to the proper standards—reducing 
antitrust litigation spending through compliance rather than laxity.  
Additionally, the judiciary’s increased experience could decrease the 
per-case cost of litigation.285  The news companies could revert to 
their pre-LNSA methods of acquiring original content. 
Although the cost concerns are rational, weighing the positives 
against the negatives shows that the balance favors quality-based 
enforcement.  Consider an increase of quality-based antitrust 
enforcement in the broadcast television market.  Currently, this 
enforcement is negligible, making any spending on enforcement a 
cost attributable to the new strategy.286  Any change in the market 
would also be a result of the increased enforcement.  To begin, the 
Commission or the Division would choose a market with LNSAs, in 
which they would likely prevail.  Because the sharing is facially so 
extreme in Honolulu, the city would be an ideal starting point.287  If 
the agency prevailed, the next case brought would have the Honolulu 
case law to support it.288  As the enforcement progressed to different 
market groups, firms would dissolve LNSAs rather than face the 
certain litigation expenses.  Eventually, firms beyond the television 
broadcast industry would take note and adjust their course.  In the 
end, the Agencies would litigate relatively few cases compared to the 
number of horizontal agreements that would break up. 
 
 283. See supra Part I.A. 
 284. Additionally, courts have dealt with overzealous attempts at enforcing 
antitrust laws in the past, indicating the system is already prepared. In re Indus. Gas 
Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 285. It was experience that allowed the judiciary to qualify certain activities as per 
se illegal, conserving judicial resources in the process. See supra notes 48–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 201–03. 
 287. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 288. On the other hand, if the agencies increase enforcement and lose at trial, their 
additional litigation expenditures might be counterproductive, encouraging firms to 
push the boundaries of antitrust law even further. 
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B. Develop Strategies for Quantifying Quality 
The Community attempts to define quality in enforcement actions 
by requiring parties to define the relevant market.289  The 
Commission’s initial failure in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc. 
demonstrates how difficult quantifying quality can be.290  Two factors 
favor the Community’s quantification of quality: (1) successful quality 
collusion will only occur in industries where it is practical to fix 
quality, and (2) in certain cases, enforcement will only require 
determining the direction and not the magnitude of a quality 
manipulation.  Thus, when implemented in conjunction with 
retrospective studies, to enhance the enforcement actions’ 
effectiveness, there are no compelling reasons to ignore quality 
collusion. 
Although the qualities of simple products, like bolts or hard red 
spring wheat, are easily quantifiable, most products are more 
complex.  Even so, industries develop and implement means of 
quantifying difficult-to-measure qualities.  For example, pasta 
companies measure the amount of semolina and durum wheat291 and 
cell phone companies count dropped calls.292  Even a complex service, 
like hospital care, is quantifiable, based on patient mortality and the 
number of foreign objects retained after surgery.293  In rooting out 
quality collusion, plaintiffs can use the industries’ experts and metrics 
to prove their case. 
Quality collusion is likely to occur in industries where quality is 
easily manipulated or quantified.294  Successful cartels need to be able 
to agree on output, detect and punish cheating, and, if illegal, remain 
undetected.  The difficulties the Agencies will have in quantifying 
quality are the same difficulties that the firms face in forming 
 
 289. See supra Part II.A. 
 290. 592 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009); see supra Part II.A. 
 291. Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 292. Will Park, AT&T Customers Log the Most Dropped Call Complaints, 
Verizon Claims Fewest, INTOMOBILE (May 5, 2010, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.intomobile.com/2010/05/05/att-customers-log-the-most-dropped-call-
complaints-verizon-claims-least/ (citing ChangeWave Research). 
 293. Special Open Door Forum: Hospital Value Based Purchasing Proposed Rule 
Overview for Facilities Providers and Suppliers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/ 
downloads/0210_Slides.pdf; see also Ann L. T. Powell et al., Uniform Ripening 
Encodes a Golden 2-like Transcription Factor Regulating Tomato Fruit Chloroplast 
Development, 336 SCIENCE 1711 (2012), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6089/1711.full.pdf. 
 294. See supra Part I.B. 
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cartels.295  If firms cannot measure or manipulate product quality, 
then they will either be unable to agree, destroying the cartel before 
inception, or they will cheat and sap the supracompetitive profit from 
the cartel.296  As a result, in these industries, cartels are unworthy of 
antitrust scrutiny.  However, in industries where a cartel succeeds, the 
Agencies can use the same tools the cartel uses to operate and 
maintain compliance to condemn the cartel. 
To remedy antitrust violations in quality collusion, the Agencies 
only need to seek injunctive relief for a disparity in performance.297  
Cases where an agreement increases product quality are likely 
reasonable and therefore legal.  Accordingly, in the absence of 
monetary damages, courts can limit their query to the direction of a 
quality change without bogging themselves down with the details of 
the magnitude of the quality change.  Determining a directional 
change is generally easier than determining the magnitude of a 
change.  For example, consider two tomatoes: an heirloom tomato, 
bred for taste, grown locally on a farm, ripened on the vine, and 
picked at the peak of ripeness; the other bred for uniformity of color, 
grown in a greenhouse halfway around the globe, picked when green, 
and ripened with ethylene.298  By sampling the tomatoes, a person 
could determine which one tastes better—but objectively quantifying 
that difference would be much more difficult.  If tomato growers did 
not have antitrust immunity, then the Agencies could order the 
tomato growers’ organization disbanded—without quantifying the 
differences between the tomatoes.299 
Courts have had difficulty understanding and applying complex 
economic theory derived from industry metrics.300  The two possible 
erroneous outcomes in antitrust enforcement litigation are false 
positives and false negatives.  When faced with borderline cases, 
 
 295. See generally notes 149–58 and accompanying text. 
 296. See generally notes 149–58 and accompanying text. 
 297. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 298. Pocket K No. 12: Delayed Ripening Technology, INT’L SERVICE FOR 
ACQUISITION AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS (Apr. 2004), 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/12/default.asp. 
 299. The tomato-growing example is for illustration purposes only.  Farmers have a 
specific antitrust exemption that allows the exact agreement detailed. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 
291–92 (2006); see also FLORIDA TOMATO COMMITTEE, 
http://www.floridatomatoes.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
 300. See, e.g., Cellophane Fallacy, supra Part I.A. 
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lower courts have erred on the side of lax enforcement301—minimizing 
the risk of false positives.  On the other side, the quality collusion 
enforcement vacuum limits the cost of false negatives to the cost of 
litigation.  However, because cartels can exact such a high price on 
society,302 the Community should seriously consider increasing its 
quality collusion enforcement efforts. 
There are few industries where quality is as subjective as it is in 
LBTN, yet it is at times necessary to quantify quality.  In addition, the 
Agency will have to prove the existence of a restraint and prove that 
the restraint is unreasonable.  To examine quality, plaintiffs or the 
Agency could measure the broadcast content as other have done, or 
develop new metrics.  Based on these metrics, the Agency would have 
to show an injury to establish that the restraint is unreasonable. 
Studies by Danilo Yanich and Gregory S. Crawford303 have 
quantified numerous quality indicators.  Going beyond these studies, 
the Community could quantify the number of unique news stories in a 
market, the number of minutes dedicated to unique news stories, the 
number of viewpoints on a given topic, as well as turning to the 
industry’s existing market data.  Alternatively, the Agencies could 
simply rely on the absence of differentiation—for example, the fact 
that multiple stations use the same camera, the same studio, the same 
on-air personality, the same script, or even identical programming—
to show that quality was fixed.  The directional shift in quality could 
then be determined by comparing the quality of the broadcast in that 
market with the quality of the broadcast in other equivalent markets.  
Whether a study could be extensive or reliable enough to convince a 
court remains untested; however the possibility exists.  If a college 
professor with a team of research assistants quantified certain aspects 
of LBTN,304 the news and its quality is clearly quantifiable. 
Based on these studies, the Agencies still would have to prove that 
the restraints are unreasonable.  The opinions of Judge Learned 
Hand,305 congressional action relating to other news media,306 and 
statutory and regulatory language307 make it clear that the LNSA’s 
 
 301. Compare FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032–33 (D.C. Cir. 
2008), with Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servss, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 302. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra Part I.C. 
 304. See supra Part I.C. 
 305. See infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra Part I.A. 
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duplicative and constrictive news coverage harms society.  It is 
equally clear that the Commission or the Division should pursue 
LNSAs in accordance with the existing antitrust laws. 
C. Utilize a Three-Factor Framework 
Because horizontal agreements on quality can have a legitimate 
business purpose,308 and the per se rule is reserved for activities that 
lack a legitimate business purpose, quality collusion would probably 
be judged under either a ROR, which can be expensive, or a quick 
look analysis, which only handles cases that are easier to determine.  
This Note advances a three-factor framework that could simplify the 
initial sorting when determining whether an agreement is reasonable.  
By providing the courts with this framework, market participants can 
make better strategic decisions, Agencies can decide when to bring 
cases more accurately, and courts can execute more consistent and 
accurate rulings in less time with less cost. 
Clarifying the boundary between legal and illegal conduct could 
increase compliance.  When deciding whether to pursue an antitrust 
claim, the Agencies face many of the same questions a cartel faces 
during its formation: What will the litigation cost?  What is the likely 
profitability of the cartel?  What is an enforcement action’s probable 
outcome?  Moreover, there are other legitimate concerns.  The three-
factor framework will help both sides by demarcating the boundary 
between legitimate and illegitimate actions.  Answering in the 
affirmative for any of the three factors would demand a deeper probe. 
1. The Three Factors, Generally 
Standardization can enhance competition.  Question one 
determines the first factor: “Does the industry typically compete on 
the facet of quality that is allegedly manipulated?”  This inquiry 
carves out an exception for industries enhanced by standardization.  
Product standardizations, such as the protein content of hard red 
spring wheat traded on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, allow 
manufacturers that use the wheat to buy from whoever is able to 
supply it.309  The demand of a large manufacturer may exceed a 
farmer’s supply.  In that case, standardization allows smaller farmers 
to provide the market with wheat, even if they cannot meet the needs 
of the larger buyer alone.  The Minneapolis Grain Exchange has 
 
 308. See supra Part I.B. 
 309. See supra note 126. 
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existed since 1881 due to the mutually beneficial agreement.310  The 
exchange’s long history would provide it with security from 
enforcement. 
Many markets self-correct without involving the legal system.  
Question two determines the second factor: “Is the market 
susceptible to small yet substantial changes in quality without a 
reflexive demand change?”  In this case, markets reach a competitive 
equilibrium naturally.311  In markets with quality inelastic demand, 
self-correction may be limited.312  If this occurs, a cartel can reduce 
quality without a demand shift returning the market to a competitive 
level, allowing the cartel to earn supracompetitive profits. 
The second question can be critical in two-sided markets, where 
one side of the market subsidizes the other.  The disconnect between 
consumption and compensation facilitates a profitable reduction in 
quality by acting as a barrier between the suppliers and the 
consumers.  For example, in the oral hygiene market, dentists exist in 
a two-sided market.  Consumption and compensation are severed: 
employers select and pay insurance companies; insurance companies 
pay dentists based on patients’ consumption.  Worsening matters, 
patients have a difficult time ascertaining quality of care.  As a result, 
a dental cartel could agree to restrict the quality of filling materials.  
The market structure limits the patients’ recourse to extremes: change 
their employers, purchase different yet duplicative insurance, or try to 
pressure their employers into pressuring the insurance company into 
pressuring the dentists into providing high-quality fillings.  All of the 
solutions are far removed from the dental chair.  Consequently, the 
theoretical dentist cartel could maintain supracompetitive profits. 
Because procompetitive restraints are reasonable and reasonable 
restraints are legal, determining the likelihood of quality collusion 
requires answering a third question: “Does the alleged collusion cause 
a cognizable net social harm?”  If answered in the negative, it releases 
from review those fledgling industries with a short track record that 
might otherwise require scrutiny under the first factor.  The question 
is a threshold—if the harm is substantial enough to be reasonably 
 
 310. See MGEX, supra note 126. 
 311. Because the transaction does not involve price, changes in consumer utility 
serve as a proxy to measure the change in value.  In line with how the 1992 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES were applied, supra note 35, a theoretical 5% 
change in consumer utility, without a corresponding change in output, would indicate 
the potential for monopoly power. See supra note 147. 
 312. Courts must be careful not to commit the Cellophane Fallacy in answering 
this question. See supra Part I.A. 
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cognizable, then this factor is satisfied.  Aside from the suggestions in 
Part III.B, to answer this question courts can and should consider 
whether the consumers or the firms are pressing for standardization.  
If consumers are pressing for a standardized product, a socially 
cognizable harm is less likely.313  Returning to the oral hygiene 
market, if the lower quality filling material caused excess tooth decay, 
there is obviously social cognizable harm.  In comparison, if the 
dentists pressed manufacturers to standardize the shape of the clips 
used to fasten a patient’s bib to increase the dental hygienists’ 
efficiency, it would benefit consumers and therefore be unlikely to 
cause a socially cognizable harm. 
Members of the Community or society may fear the three-factor 
test or framework is either over- or under-inclusive.  Consumers want 
an inclusive framework to avoid monopoly prices.  Suppliers want to 
avoid over-inclusion to have more flexibility to compete.  The first 
two questions ensure that the net is fine enough to catch 
anticompetitive horizontal agreements on quality and protect 
consumers.  The final question protects firms from overzealous 
enforcement.  Although walking a fine line, retrospective studies, 
discussed below, will enhance the accuracy of the framework over 
time, and ensure it works in practice. 
2. The Three-Factor Test as Applied to the LBTN Market 
Local Broadcast Television News stations entered into horizontal 
agreements that coordinated their activities.314  This section applies 
the three-factor test to the agreements’ information that is available 
publicly.  Obviously, a more precise application could be 
accomplished with more information. 
The first factor is whether firms in the industry typically compete 
on quality.  Operating in a two-sided market, LBTN stations compete 
for advertisers, necessitating a competition for viewers.  The clearest 
examples of inter-station competition are the prices stations pay for 
exclusive content, such as the Super Bowl.  The advertising rates 
broadcasters can charge for spots during exclusive events makes the 
station’s cost of the event worthwhile.  If it were less clear, a court 
 
 313. When the Industrial Revolution was in its infancy, toolmakers, the bolt 
consumers, pressed for standardization, and the result was an increase in 
competition. William Sellers, The United States Standard Screw Threads (1864), 
ASME, http://anniversary.asme.org/2005landmarks3.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 
2012). 
 314. See supra Part I.C. 
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could look to whether the firms or the consumers were pressing for 
standardization.  The covert nature of many of the agreements makes 
it clear that the agreements are for the stations’ benefit; were they for 
the benefit of the public, the participants would tout them as 
examples of customer appreciation. 
The second factor is whether the market is susceptible to a 
substantial change in quality without a reflexive change in demand.  
The LNSA market is conducive to cartelization because supply and 
demand are inelastic,315 allowing price increases to be profitable.  The 
market is concentrated, making agreements easier to reach.316  Lastly, 
significant barriers to entry in the form of regulations317 and market 
structure prevent new entrants from increasing competition.318  As a 
result, demand cannot correct anticompetitive quality restrictions.  
LNSAs naturally overcome the remaining hurdles cartels face.  Once 
LBTN stations come to an agreement and form a cartel, the rest falls 
into place.  LNSAs effectively force the identical output across 
several firms,319 making cheating impossible and unnecessary.  For 
example, for a cartel member in Charleston, South Carolina, to 
“cheat” it would both subsidize its competition and bear the full cost 
of its unique content—making it financially unfeasible.  The closest 
that firms can get to cheating are marginal improvements in quality 
such as anchor or set quality.  Furthermore, even if cheating were 
possible, the public nature of broadcast television allows instant 
detection and nearly instant punishment by the cartel. 
The final question is whether the collusion results in a socially 
cognizable harm.  LNSAs cause several.  Judge Learned Hand 
articulated the clearest harm in the context of news, when he 
explained that “one of the most vital of all general interests [is] the 
dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as 
many different facets and colors as is possible.”320  Because LNSAs 
share scripts and restrict the number of unique stories, they 
inherently have significantly fewer facets and colors.321  In keeping 
with Judge Learned Hand’s statement, society is harmed.  
Reinforcing the judge, the rationale for the Newspaper Preservation 
 
 315. See supra Part I.C. 
 316. See supra Part I.C. 
 317. See supra Part I.A. 
 318. See supra Part I.C. 
 319. See supra Part I.C. 
 320. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945). 
 321. See Yanich, supra note 1, at 25–27. 
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Act of 1977322 acknowledges the importance of editorial diversity, 
placing it above other antitrust concerns: newspapers received 
antitrust immunity conditioned on maintaining editorial 
independence.  To ignore quality collusion in television broadcasting 
while disallowing the same behavior in other media is hypocritical.  
There is certainly enough evidence to support an investigation into 
the negative impact SSAs have on quality in the market. 
In sum, the LNSAs satisfy the three factors: the market typically 
competes on the quality of programming; it is susceptible to 
substantial changes in quality without reflexive changes in demand; 
and the reduction in the news output is a cognizable social harm.  
Accordingly, if LNSAs as they stand today were prosecuted, they 
would be found illegal, barring other justifications or defenses.  
Although these justifications are allowed, they are rarely successful.  
To ensure the effectiveness of the factors it is important that the 
Agencies study the results. 
D. Conduct Retrospective Analyses of the Aforementioned 
Strategies 
Retrospective studies are possibly the most important and smallest 
addition to federal antitrust policy of the proposed suggestions.  
Economic theory, modeling, and analyses, which drive antitrust law, 
are evolving and growing in sophistication and accuracy.323  Past 
actions provide the best data available to determine the 
appropriateness of future actions and retrospective studies will make 
future economic models more accurate.324  Additional retrospective 
studies could provide insight into cases brought by the Commission 
and Division.  While retrospective studies are completed on a limited 
basis, additional analyses could enable the agencies to utilize their 
resources more efficiently, curtail anticompetitive activity more 
effectively, adjust their publications and guidelines, and promote 
competitive behavior that the Agencies initially considered 
anticompetitive. 
 
 322. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006). 
 323. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 
(1956), with FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).  Unfortunately, it 
may be impossible to perform thorough analysis in cases where the enforcement 
action failed because much of the data will remain private. 
 324. Unfortunately, cases are decided without hindsight. 
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Retrospective studies are not more prevalent, because they are 
expensive and drain the Agencies’ resources325 in the short term, even 
if they may produce long-term cost savings.  Unfortunately, given that 
the Agencies’ budgets are limited, they may need to shift resources 
from current enforcement actions to retrospective studies that will 
enhance future enforcement.  It is unclear which path is more 
efficient in the end. 
Regarding the LBTN industry, the Agencies should look at former 
media enforcement actions, litigated or not, such as Raycom and 
News Corporation Limited with an eye on quality collusion.  
Additionally, as the Agencies move forward, they should continue to 
conduct retrospective studies to determine whether the original 
remedies were effective or needed.  To make the studies more 
effective, the consent decrees may call for specific language that 
requires the firms to provide the Agencies with certain information.  
These studies could prove invaluable to determining the best course 
of action going forward, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
federal antitrust laws, and thereby improving the quality of the news. 
CONCLUSION 
The status quo leaves the door wide open.  Firms openly collude on 
quality without fear, and broadcast stations collude, causing 
significant social harm.  The neglect likely stems from the difficulty in 
measuring and the complex nature of quality restraints.  These 
justifications can only bend antitrust laws so far and in certain 
markets.  The justifications appear non-existent, while the social costs 
remain high.  In these markets, quality collusion requires closer 
scrutiny.  Unfortunately, the problems with quality collusion extend 
beyond television, and the potential consequences can be more 
severe.  What if pharmaceutical companies decided that the drugs 
they have developed to cure cancer were sufficient?  What if they 
agreed to fix quality at the current level?  Quality collusion should be 
pursued as vigorously as price collusion. 
To enforce antitrust laws in accordance with their statutory 
language, the Community needs to shift its stance.  It must increase 
enforcement to reduce quality collusion as it occurs and deter quality 
collusion in the first place.  The Community can develop strategies to 
quantify quality, or use an industry’s metrics to prove the existence of 
cognizable social harms in court.  It can also institute a framework for 
 
 325. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
MCMILLAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2013  10:48 PM 
1942 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
courts to follow, such as the three-factor test advanced by this Note, 
to streamline litigation and work towards eliminating quality 
collusion.  These changes will allow courts to provide relief from the 
cost our society pays for collusion. 
